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Economists invoke Mundell (1961) in arguing for the general policy of a flexible exchange 
rate regime as a means of restoring equilibria after shocks. But there is a discrepancy between 
the intent of the general policy and attempts at its implementation as identified by specific 
changes in exchange rates.  When we assemble the set of specific changes called for by 
distinct economists operating as advocates for individual countries, these are uniformly in the 
form of beggar-thy-neighbour advice – ie travesties of objectively identifying disequilibria 
and  a  menace  to  international  cooperation  and  peace.    This  paper  traces  the  unintended 
travesties to problems of complexity and uncertainty, problems that implicitly are assumed 
absent in Mundell (1961) rendering the situation so simple that equilibria are transparent.  
The problems remained essentially unaddressed when economists extended Mundell (1961) 
via expected utility theory since this theory also ignores the impossibility of maximising and 
the complexities of central bankers, private firms and others in doing the evaluation stage in 
reaching decisions.  The problems can be overcome by modelling within SKAT, the Stages of 
Knowledge Ahead Theory.  This paper points to experimental evidence in support of the view 
that under all sorts of disequilibrating shocks, currency unions outperform flexible currencies 
by eliminating the inefficiencies generated by exchange rate uncertainty. 
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In the optimal currency area model of Mundell (1961), were there a shock of a 
particular sort, changing the exchange rate would enable attainment of the new 
equilibrium.    Yearly  economists  proffer  new  estimates  identifying  pairs  of 
countries with such shocks and concluding that these countries would suffer 
disequilibria  if  joined  in  a  currency  union.  Without  personally  researching 
country  shock  characteristics,  an  even  larger  body  of  economists,  appeal  to 
Mundell's general concept of equilibrating exchange rate changes deliberately 
executed by a country's official sector.  
This  paper  shows  that  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  impartial 
objective and admirable intent of having a general policy of flexible exchange 
rates in order to restore disequilibria and the specific calls of economists to 
change exchange rates in the name of restoring equilibrium.  It shows that the 
specific  calls  are  biased,  traces  the  sources  for  the  bias,  how  alternative 
modelling  can  avoid  these  biases,  and via  an  experimental  set-up,  points  to 
evidence  that  currency  unions  are  better  for  maintaining  international 
competitiveness  and  in  this  sense,  better  for  maintaining  international 
equilibrium. 
Parts 2 and 3 present the gist of the optimal currency area model of 
Mundell  (1961), its  origin  in  the  Swan  assignments  model, and  economists' 
attempts to apply it.  Part 4 outlines Mundell's consistent opposition to use of 
that model to justify distinct currencies, and some of that model's deficiencies 
already identified in the literature.  Part 5 identifies a trio of largely overlooked 
deficiencies in the model.  These are assumptions of: (i) certainty concerning the 
future exchange rate; (ii) certainty concerning the ability of policy makers to 
discern where is equilibrium; and (iii) every country being too small to damage 
any  other  or  face  retaliatory  action.    It  traces  how  this  set  of  assumptions 
destroys the model's mechanism for enabling exchange rate changes to restore 
equilibrium after a shock.  It demonstrates how real world complexity interacts 
with the model's simplistic small world certainty assumptions to generate the 
uniformly beggar-thy-neighbour advice from economists advising exchange rate 
changes.   
Parts 6 and 7 concern the way forward, ie how to help those economists 
who advise exchange rate changes to recognise: a) their inability to get to first 
base in  discerning  equilibria; and  b) the  damage  that may  be wrought  from 
mistakenly  depreciating  and  from  the  additional  complexity  that  variable 
exchange rates involve.  That way forward for safer economic modelling of the 
exchanges  rate  change  effects  is  aided  by  SKAT, the  Stages  of  Knowledge 
Ahead Theory of choice under risk and uncertainty.  In SKAT one stage is that 
of evaluating alternatives. The evaluation stage is ignored in Mundell (1961) 
and its subsequent expected utility theory extensions, as this class of models 
excludes the possibility that economists could make an evaluation mistake such 
as misdiagnosing the nature of a disequilibrium and how it might be corrected.   
Part 8 points to an experimental application of SKAT, and a finding on 
the merit of currency unions, indeed of a single world money.  The finding is 
that a single currency avoids the inefficiencies of agents making mistakes about 
equilibrium in the more complex world of variable exchange rates and thus of 
exchange rate uncertainty.  Part 9 concerns the different challenges economists Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  3  16 April 2008 
take  on  in  analysing  within  SKAT  rather  than  taking  on  the  challenges  of 
extending our current battery of maximising models.  Part 10 summarises. 
 
2  BACKGROUND 
Beggar-thy-neighbour dirty floats were commonplace in the 1930s.  A country 
depreciated to seek to solve its unemployment problem by boosting its export 
and import competing industries.  Often soon after, another country retaliated 
with a depreciation.  In due course countries decided that none was too small to 
be sure of escaping retaliation, that world trade and global welfare had suffered 
drastically under the uncertainties of associated with such escalating exchange 
rate changes.   With exceedingly few exceptions, economists and others alike 
deemed  that  a  preferable  exchange  rate  regime  was  the  Bretton  Woods 
Agreement.   
  Now  when  by  the  end  of  the  1930s,  economists  had  reaching  a 
recognition  of  beggar-thy-neighbour  activity  and  global  bias  in  their  policy 
advice,  it  might  be  thought  that  this  has  remained  part  of  general  economic 
understanding.  It might be thought that economists today would be sensitive to 
the issue of whether as a profession, they qualify as objective with an overview 
of cause and effect and of the desirability of proffering to countries sustainable 
exchange rate advice that avoids beggar-thy-neighbour policies.  But as shown 
below economists became absorbed in other issues and have forgotten entirely 
the importance of doing global checks to see if they have fallen back into the 
ignominious beggar-thy-neighbour trap of which  so many were guilty in the 
later 1920s and early 1930s. 
One matter distracting economists from simple global checks on whether 
their  advice  is  objective  has  been  the  investment  of  closed  form  algebraic 
modelling  of  macroeconomics.    Within  this  closed  form  algebraic  approach, 
Swan  (1952)  pioneered  analysis  of  how  a  country  might  maintain 
macroeconomic  equilibrium  internally  (neither  over  nor  under  activity)  and 
externally (current account balance).  Swan put the case that the official sector 
ought assist, and not rely exclusively on market forces after shocks as in the 
gold standard era.  He noted that two instruments that the official sector could 
use in re-establishing equilibrium internally and externally after shocks could be 
the exchange rate and fiscal policy (the level of demand).  If a shock meant that 
nominal  wages  were  too  high,  given  that  nominal  wages  were  sticky,  a 
depreciation could, given certain  speeds  of  response  of  other variables, more 
rapidly restore equilibrium, and so forth.  He proposed assigning control of the 
exchange rate to the central bank and fiscal policy to the treasury.  He furnished 
informative  algebraic  and  graphical  accounts  of  the  possible  speeds  of  re-
attaining  equilibrium  internally  and  externally,  with  further  developments  in 
Swan (1953 and 1960).   
Mundell  applied  Swan's  model  to  ask  what  sort  of  shocks  must  a 
country  encounter  for  changing  the  exchange  rate  to  be  an  efficient  way  to 
restore equilibrium after these  shocks.      In the same  spirit,  Mundell applied 
Swan’s model to ask under what sort of shocks would changing the exchange  
rate  be  an  inefficient  means  of  restoring  equilibrium,  so  that  it  would  be 
preferable for the country to avoid ever changing its exchange rate by forming a 
currency union, Mundell (1961).  Mundell via his application of the Swan model 
has  captured  the  imagination  of  generations  of  economists  with  curiosity  to 
ascertain  the  nature  of  shocks  buffetting  an  area,  and  whether  their  nature 
indicates, according to Mundell (1961), merit in retention of a separate currency 
so as to use exchange rate changes to restore equilibrium more quickly.  Over Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  4  16 April 2008 
fifty years later, the notion continues that multiple currencies are desirable so as 
to enable exchange rate changes between currencies that do not constitute an 
“optimal” currency area, eg Alesina et al (2002), Mongelli (2002), Baldwin and 
Wyplosz (2004), Lee (2007). 
In the Swan-Mundell model everybody in both countries understands 
where, after the shock, is the new equilibrium.  Everyone understands that it is 
good (with rigid nominal wages) for one of the two countries to depreciate to 
restore the international level of competitiveness after a special sort of shock.  
Thus there is no scope for retaliation.  Everybody agrees that the single never-to-
be  repeated exchange  rate change is  beneficial to  both countries and will  be 
instantly implemented.   
 
3  BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOUR 
a The Accounting Identity Test of Objective Exchange Rate Advice 
If the world were as in Mundell (1961), no country would ever face the risk of 
being accused of beggar-thy-neighbour activity in lobbying another country to 
appreciate or in itself depreciating.  In the world of Mundell (1961), as in reality, 
there is an adding up accounting identity.  The accounting identity is that the 
disequilibrium of overfull employment in one currency bloc is matched by a 
disequilibrium of inadequate employment in the other currency bloc.  After a 
shock, both currency blocs recognise and agree on the sort of shock and both 
agree if one currency bloc should appreciate, ie both agree which is the other 
currency that should depreciate.  
Now contrast reality with the simple algebraic Swan-Mundell world.  If 
disequilibria are so simply discernible, we should find a roughly equal number 
of currency blocs declaring that they are suffering from overfull employment 
(and so wishing to appreciate) as the reverse.  Such however is not the case.  
Economists advise virtually every land that their country's unemployment woes 
arise via too high wages relative to international competitors.  Those bemoaning 
overfull  employment  (to  be  cured  by  an  appreciation)  are  non-existent, even 
when we consider conceivable cases like Singapore and Australia.   
 
b  Advice to Raise Wages to Restore the International Competitive Equilibrium 
Singapore is perhaps the only economy seeking to have that country's wage level 
raised relative to other countries.  Singapore's recurrent appreciation decisions, 
however, cannot be classified as inspired by notions of restoring labour market 
equilibria after shocks.  Singapore is a directed economy.  Its political directors 
have been explicit that their goal is to prevent Singapore having cheap labour and 
to force those undertaking direct foreign investment in Singapore into activities 
involving higher skilled more expensive labour. 
In Australia, but behind closed doors, there was an era in the mid 1980s 
after a wage freeze had been negotiated.  This era comes close to the notion of a 
country's  advocates  deeming  its  wages  too  low  as  regards  international 
competitiveness.  The governor of the central bank implored the leader of the 
union movement (on the central bank board) to raise wages since international 
competitiveness was too high and local skilled labour too scarce.  The request to 
raise  wages  was  refused  –  on  the  grounds  that  the  union  leaders  who  had 
negotiated union acceptance of the wage freeze would loose face.  Even this case 
however, falls short of being a Swan-Mundell style disequilibrium.  For this was 
a  complicated  situation,  in  which  the  wage  freeze  had  lowered  skills  wage Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  5  16 April 2008 
margins,  while  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  were  complements  hired  in 
relatively  fixed  proportions.    Firms  had the  bottleneck  of insufficient  skilled 
workers precluding them from employing more unskilled workers and reducing 
unemployment of the unskilled.  In short this was not an era in which Australia's 
general wage level was too low for international competitiveness causing a Swan-
Mundell disequilibrium of overfull employment.  It was rather an era of a skill to 
unskilled wage rate disequilibrium, something not solvable by an exchange rate 
change. 
 
c Advice to Depreciate to Aid Local Output and Employment 
There  are  thus  no  cases  of  economic  advocates  of  a  given  country  seeking 
appreciations to aid that country back to its employment equilibrium.  Economic 
advocates  of  a  country  call  exclusively  for  an  effective  depreciation  for  that 
country.  The notion that every country has suffered a special sort of shock that 
might be aided by a depreciation is untenable.  It violates accounting identities 
that require each case of underemployment must be matched by overemployment 
in the partner currency blocs.  The fair Swan-Mundell model translates in the 
complexity of the real world into a beggar-thy-neighbour dirty float policy.  The 
complexity of the real world generates uncertainty on just where is equilibrium 
and just what sorts of shocks have occurred.  A few examples of these biased 
calls for exchange rate changes may be helpful. 
US advocates have for several years called on China to appreciate the 
Renminbi.  They see in such an appreciation a solution to the US's virtually 
jobless  private  sector  recovery  after  2000,  declare  China's  reluctance  to 
appreciate anti-social behaviour, eg Simmons (2006), and estimate substantial 
US trade gains from a Renminbi appreciation, eg Thorbecke (2006). For its part, 
China seeks to avoid this appreciation as far as is feasible, given its massive 
unemployment problems.  
Across the Atlantic, the situation is similar.  The EU calls on China to 
appreciate against its members' currencies to give EU exporters a "fair go" and 
to  alleviate  high  unemployment  rates  in  the  EU.    As  with  US  economists 
campaigning  for  appreciations  of  the  Renminbi,  these  calls  carefully  avoid 
offering comparable statistics on the relative unemployment rates of China and 
the EU.  Instead they highlight some other index perceived to denote exchange 
rate  equilibrium  eg  the  bilateral  trade  balance  (with  a  careful  avoidance  of 
mention of the multi-lateral trade and capital flows perspective that they endorse 
via the WTO's free trade manifesto).   
Within the EU, the story is the same.  There are campaigns to have Italy 
quit  the  EURO  so  as  to  depreciate  against  Germany  and  solve  Italy's 
unemployment problem.  Amongst apologists for Germany, there is essentially 
the reverse belief, namely that German's international competitiveness has sunk 
so far below equilibrium that it has turned into a bazaar economy – meaning an 
economy unable to contribute virtually any value added to its imports before they 
are  exported,  and  thus  unable  to  hire  enough  people  and  mop  up  its 
unemployment.  See eg Sinn (2003, 2005a, 2005b).  
The same holds for historical studies of unemployment problems facing 
specific countries.  These propose that high unemployment suffered by some 
countries in say the 1930s could have been remedied by depreciations, or by 
depreciating earlier.  Such studies likewise essentially assume that there would 
have  been  no  retaliatory  action.    They  also  often  locate  international 
competitiveness series and evidence on the types of shocks studied that in the 
spirit of Mundell (1961) corroborate their conclusion, eg Eichengreen (1992). Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  6  16 April 2008 
Economists however have failed to notice that when all these  specific 
calls for depreciation are laid side by side, there is an adding up problem.  When 
one side uses one index to measure the disequilibrium demonstrating its need to 
depreciate, the other side rarely grapples with this directly.  Instead apologists 
for  the  other  side  latch  onto  a  different  index,  and  its  usage  goes  largely 
unquestioned in academic journals or in the media.   
There is an implicit opposition to these beggar-thy-neighbour calls in 
investigations  to  better  stabilise  exchange  rates,  eg  Wilson  and  Ren  (2007).  
There  are  questionings  about  whether  there  is  the  particular  disequilibrium 
supposed,  or  whether  changing  the  exchange  rate  might  have  undesired 
consequences, eg Eckes (1999) and Wang, Hui and Soofi (2007), Tatom (2007).  
There  is  even  explicit  opposition  to  these  beggar-thy-neighbour  calls  for 
exchange rate changes, Mundell (2003, 2005), McKinnon (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2007a,  2007b),  McKinnon  and  Schnabl  (2006).   All  these  objections  to  the 
proposed  beggar-thy-neighbour  exchange  rate  depreciations  warrant 
consideration, and in varying degrees tell against flexible exchange rates.  But 
none of these objections include the simplest objection, namely the demonstrated 
incapacity of economists calling for exchange rate changes, to be in the right ball 
park in discerning disequilibria – to be instead invariably – not occasionally – 
biased  
Davidson (2007) is an exception, taking a more statesman-like approach 
and identifies the global lack of objectivity of economists in these sorts of calls 
for  restoring  international  equilibria.    Davidson  notes  the  universal  calls  of 
economists for lower wages to cure that particular country's disequilibrium of 
unemployment.  He notes that if a country heeded its economists' calls for lower 
real  wages  to  solve  its  unemployment  problem,  it  would  be  exporting  the 
unemployment  problem  to  others  who  already  are  labouring  under  high 
unemployment.  
 
4  MUNDELL'S OBJECTION 
Mundell  (1961) attributes  the  horrors  of the  1930s to the  failure to  quickly 
enough make the Bretton Woods agreement and remove floating exchange rates 
and beggar-thy-neighbour competitive depreciations.   He never advocated the 
abandonment of Bretton Woods, never praised floating exchange rates, as have 
numerous scientists who refer to his 1961 model.  Unlike Swan, he has never 
been an advocate of using power to alter exchange rates. 
Mundell  rightly  complains  that  he  distanced  himself  from  floats  in 
Mundell (1961) – not merely in his (1973) piece taking into account capital 
flows, and his subsequent advocacy since of a single world money, eg Mundell 
(2003).   He objects to the persistent misinterpretation of his 1961 article by 
those advocating floating exchange rates. He advocates a single world currency 
simply on the grounds that this will reduce transaction costs, pointed this out in 
his 1961 article, as also the matter that there was  something defective in the 
simple 1961 model since it implied that absurdly small regions could constitute 
optimal currency regions.   
The  optimal  currency  literature  has  however  by  and  large  ignored 
Mundell's 1961 observation that the logic of the model would render almost 
every tiny village an optimal currency area – largely because the observation was 
made in words.  Economists and their literature have lost much of the scientific 
dimension  that  requires  attention  to  such  an  issue  that  must  be  expressed 
verbally in their focus on algebra.  The attention to algebra has exceeded our Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  7  16 April 2008 
capacity  to  interpret  the  algebra.    Interpreting  it  involves  words  and  verbal 
arguments. 
The basic problem in the Mundell (1961) models is its implying minute 
regions could be optimal currency areas, a problem for which Mundell proffered 
one possible solution, include transaction costs.  But the economic literature did 
not take the direction of saying that it would be absurd to use this model until we 
overcome the basic problem, that at least on some empirical estimates, did not 
seem  to  be  transaction  costs  as  typically  defined.    Instead  the  literature  has 
pretended  that  there  is  no  basic  problem.    The  literature  instead  modified 
Mundell (1961) to incorporate various omitted effects that lent themselves to 
algebraic expression within either the neoclassical competitive markets paradigm 
or extensions thereof including into the expected utility theory. For informative 
surveys of the modifications, see Obstfeld (2001), Kenen (2002) and McKinnon 
(2004).    The  modifications  however,  have  not  identified  the  beggar-thy-
neighbour nature of its applications, nor indeed reduced the extent of them.  The 
beggar-thy-neighbour nature of applications of even extended Mundell (1961) 
thus stems from overlooked features. 
 
5  OVERLOOKED FEATURES 
In the Swan-Mundell model there is implicitly a once for all shock, never to be 
repeated.  Nobody ever expects another shock, and the official sector knows 
precisely  where  is  equilibrium  before  and  after.    Ie  everybody  believes  in 
certainty, always did before the shock, and always does after.  This remained the 
case, even when one uncertainty was added, that about people's desire for more 
leisure  as  distinct  from  more  material  goods  (by  working  harder)  as  in  an 
Obstfeld (2001) extension.   
But such certainty, including with respect to the exchange rate remaining 
at  the  position  to  which  it  has  now  moved,  is,  to  put  it  mildly,  a  dubious 
assumption if market agents have any shred of commonsense.  This is not to 
deny that deciders are irrational, or at least myopic, and unduly inward looking.  
For instance, it did take countries in the 1930s a while to discover that each 
country is big – ie that other countries would retaliate.  Initially they all seemed 
to think that they were "the small country case".  But of course this is untrue 
even  of  a  tiny  economy  like  Australia.    While  tiny  on  the  world  scale,  in 
Australia's primary export products (initially merino wool, now mining and coal) 
it has over the last two centuries provided of the order of a third of the total 
world supply.  All countries essentially are big – important via idiosyncracies in 
resources and geography to particular other countries that supply their imports, 
and to yet other that are rivals in export markets.   In the notorious floats of the 
interwar period, countries quickly learned that they were big, and that with the 
abandonment of the gold standard, exchange rates were exceedingly uncertain 
and unpredictable.  It is thus unfortunate that, with partial exceptions such as 
Mundell (2005), a basic lesson learned by economists and policy makers by the 
later  1930s  is  ignored  by  economic  modelling  today.    Even  for  descriptive 
purposes, this renders the models more irrational than the empirical evidence 
warrants. 
Likewise  it  is  dubious  to  propose  that  a  country  can  use  the  Swan-
Mundell exchange rate solution more than once.  In addition to traded goods 
idiosyncracies rendering every country big, as regards the international capital 
flows, no matter how small a country is moreover, lenders to it like repayment, 
not default, while the borrowers, even ones living in a tiny isle, are unappreciative 
of unanticipated hikes in what becomes due for repayment.   Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  8  16 April 2008 
A repeat Swan-Mundell solution requires both countries and all those 
other countries dealing with them to be rather more myopic and non-anticipatory 
than is the norm.  The norm is after a currency area depreciates sharply and 
unexpectedly,  lenders  to  that  area  sharply  increase  the  currency  area  risk 
premium.  The increase in currency risk premium can plausibly be interpreted as 
a realisation that the country's exchange rate is uncertain, something excluded 
under the Swan-Mundell model's reliance on certainty. This in turn excludes 
repeated use of the Mundell (1961) model within the period before forgetting 
occurs and people get lulled into seeing the future as certain.  See Allais (1972) 
and Blatt (1983) for evidence on how long is required for such forgetfulness.   
McKinnon  (1963)  noted  the  exchange  rate  certainty  assumption  of 
Mundell  (1961),  as  did  Mundell  himself  in  Mundell  (1973).    Nevertheless 
economists ignore this fatal flaw, remaining as McKinnon (2004) puts it, in the 
thrall of Mundell (1961).  Nor, in McKinnon's eyes, is Mundell himself entirely 
immune from criticism in this respect.  McKinnon (2004) argues that in several 
of Mundell's influential essays collected up to 1968, Mundell endorses the scope 
for flexible exchange rates to equilibrate and ignores the issues of exchange rate 
uncertainty.   
McKinnon  terms  Mundell  (1961)  a  Keynesian  model  because  it 
assumes sticky wages, it is a profoundly non-Keynesian model in that it ignores 
uncertainty.  But Keynes' introduction of macroeconomics is via a distinction 
between consumption goods whose demand he deemed certain, and investment 
goods whose demand he deemed uncertain.  See eg Walsh (1996, pp 56, 62-65) 
and  Davidson  (2007).    Hence an alternative classification is that of  Mundell 
(1961) being a variant on neoclassical maximising under certainty, a variant in 
which there is a constraint precluding nominal wage changes. 
The  Swan-Mundell  1961  model's  assumption  of  certainty  about  the 
exchange rate before and after the single shock is coupled with another implicit 
assumption,  namely  that  everybody  knows  exactly  what  sort  of  shock  has 
occurred and what are its (small world) consequences.  This assumption of full 
knowledge about the shock's type and consequences has misled economists in 
their analysis and policy advice concerning exchange rate regime.  In the murky 
world where  nobody  knows where  the  equilibrium  is  and  has  only  a vague 
notion  of  what  sort  of  shocks  have  occurred,  the  Swan-Mundell  world  has 
translated  into  unidirectional  advice.    As  we  saw  in  Part  3,  this  advice  is 
depreciate in order to beggar-thy-neighbour, with essentially zero countervailing 
advice  to  appreciate  in  order  to  help  others  out  of  their  unemployment 
difficulties.  The model's small world assumption helps put other countries out 
of the picture, and in the complex real world where unemployment is a recurrent 
problem, spring to the conclusion that a depreciation would help, locating a trade 
imbalance or an international "competitiveness" index of some sort that shows 
indeed that this is their country's problem.  This is despite the irony, that in 
numerous  other  countries,  including  many  of  that  country's  trading  partners, 
other economists have constructed alternative trade imbalance and international 
"competitiveness" indices that show the reverse. 
 
 
6  THE WAY AHEAD FOR ASSESSING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
CHOICE   
a  An end to Maximisation Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  9  16 April 2008 
We need a new theoretical umbrella in accord with stylised facts, Kenen (2002). 
Maximising would be feasible and within the stylised facts if we could collapse 
our goals to a univariate dimension and operate in a perfectly understood simple 
economy with equilibrium transparent to all.   We live however in a complex 
world  so  difficult to  understand  that  out  of  sample we  have  yet to  discover 
exchange rate fundamentals that have the correct sign for interest parity if they 
predict better than a random walk over the pertinent time horizon for decision 
making, Meese and Rogoff (1983), Chinn, Cheung and Pascual (2005), Alquist 
and Chinn (2006).   
One stylised fact being highlighted in this paper is how short economists 
fall of being able to maximise in the real world of policy.  Economists fall so 
short  that  those  advising  exchange  rate  changes  to  equilibrate  proffer 
systematically  biased  advice  to  beggar-thy-neighbour.    Models  constructed 
under  the  new  theoretical  umbrella  must  recognise  that  members  of  official 
sectors, of the private sector and we, its actual and would-be economic advisers, 
are fallible human beings.  We need models that include the real life heuristics of 
the key players in exchange rate markets – par excellence the official sectors.  As 
central bankers themselves report, eg Papademos (2006), and those watching 
them, eg Cobham (2002a, 2002b and 2006), they do not attempt the impossible 
of  maximising  techniques.  We  need  models  to  include  decision  makers' 
evaluation stage – instead of assuming that evaluating alternatives is a costless 
instant  maximising  process  yielding  the  Swan-Mundell  equilibria.    We  thus 
need  to  abandon  as  our  umbrella  theory  EUT,  axiomatised  expected  utility 
theory,  which  makes  these  maximising  assumptions  and  starts  the  decision 
procedure  at  the  point  of  choice  with  this  maximisation  exercise  already 
accomplished.    We  need  to  include  the  earlier  stages  of  how  choosers  find 
alternatives, and how they evaluate them.   
This  does  not  mean  that  our  economic  decision  models  are  entirely 
psychological.  It simply means that our decision models need to be constructed 
within an umbrella that recognises human frailty – including that of economists 
– and includes this as an ingredient in formulating decision procedures. We do 
not comment on a water boiling apparatus that turns off automatically once the 
water boiled, "oh this is a purely psychological product.  So we reject it and buy 
the cheaper one that ignores human mistakes and does not automatically turn 
off."  Rather, we consider the past evidence of how often in our home or office 
(or wherever it is to be used), fallible humans have forgotten to switch off the 
power  once  the  water  has  boiled,  necessitating  us  in  the  cost  and  time  of 
replacing the burned-out element.  In so considering, we are being reasonable 
and rational.   
So-called rational economic models ignore evaluation difficulties.  The 
ignored evaluation difficulties include those of determining whether a pair of 
countries  is  facing  a  disequilibrium  caused  by  a  particular  shock  such  that 
equilibrium could be restored by an exchange rate change are in fact irrational.  
Such models ignore the past history of economists' incapacity to identify these.  
Economists have an established record of systematic bias in their identifications 
of needed exchange rate changes.   
To do what economists do and ignore this bias is analogous to ignoring 
the matter that in a particular office, at least every second time the hot water 
appliance has previously been turned on, the element was burned out.1  A second 
                                                 
1  Note that every second time allows for a situation in which each time depreciation is 
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problem is economists' inference that their algebraic models allow maximising 
conclusions.  To have such hubris and to conclude that such a model deduces 
what is optimal is to be oblivious to the fact that our models simplify, abstract, 
and contain other flaws we miss.  For all these reasons, the conclusions drawn 
are from our fallible heuristics of the modelling, of abstracting, not from genuine 
maximising.  
 
b  An End to Atemporal theorising 
We cannot just graft the evaluation stage and other earlier stages onto EUT.  
This is because EUT, when consistently applied, excludes attributing utility to 
any segment of the outcome flow that occurs before all risk and uncertainty is 
past,  Samuelson  (1952),  Pope  (2006)  and  that  remaining  segment  of  the 
outcome flow must, as Friedman and Savage (1948) put it, be evaluated "as if 
certain".  See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
The Jump Through of the Prior Periods of Uncertainty to Certainty 
that occurs under EUT and its Standard Rank Dependent Generalisations   
t=0  0≤t<k  t≥k 
Choice 
 
Period(s) of risk 
 
Period after  
risk is past 
a risky act ie an act with at 
least I≥2 possible final 
segments Yi, i=1, ... I of the 
outcome flow  
These segments of the outcome flow are 
jumped over and ignored even though 
they occur after t=0 
utility Ui=U(Yi) of 
each possible final 
segment  
Yi, i=1, ... I        
EUT's ignoring of risk in mapping outcomes Yi into utilities can be seen 
from the right hand column of Figure 1 where the probability distribution – that 
denotes the chooser's degree of risk, ie of knowledge ahead – does not affect the 
Ui's.  V, the utility U(V) of a risky choice is, 
        U(V)  =
  
i=1
I   pi  U(Yi)            (1) 
 
atemporal aggregation weight 
outside time 




Nothing that is anticipated to be happen in the future in reality – ie within 
time – concerning risk that can impact on utility, is in EUT's equation (1).  The 
only  way  risk  enters  is  atemporally,  in  how  probabilities  concerning  the 
mutually exclusive outcomes aggregated to attain a single overall value of the 
alternative.  This limit of risk effects to their atemporal aggregation role pertains 
to the limited role of risk in the Obstfeld (2001) extension of the Swan-Mundell 
model to include risk in the form of shock changes in the preference for leisure 
relative to material goods in one of the countries. 
Under EUT the atemporal aggregation rule is simple probability weights.  
Under cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other 
standard  rank  dependent  generalisations,  the  atemporal  aggregation  rule  is  a 
more complex (de-) cumulative probability function, but still no real time risk 
                                                                                                                                
be correct – while we violate our definition of equilibrium, to propose that the advice on 
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effects  are  included  as  the  anticipated  utility  mapping  is  identical  to  that  of 
equation (1).   
The same "as if certain" property is even inadvertently embedded, generating 
timing contradictions, in efforts to solve the problem by elaborating the EUT 
outcomes,  Pope  (1983,  1985a,  2000).    It  even  recurs  when  the  axioms  are 
replaced by temporal ones as in Kreps and Porteus (1978) or Klibanoff and 
Ozdrenen  (2007).    This  is  because  an  axiomatisation  has  to  derive  its 
representation  theorem  –  its  distinctive  expected  utility  property  of  using 
probabilities as atemporal weights to aggregate the mutually exclusive outcomes.  
To derive this it has to include a compound gamble axiom in which its falsely 
attributes  simultaneity  to  the  sequence  of  when  the  temporal  succession  of 
probabilities successively become degenerate, Pope (1985a, 2005, 2006). 
 
 
c  SKAT 
To consistently model the decision process and avoid missing out on all those 
cause effect chains generated by uncertainty before and after choice, we need 
SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, Pope (1983, 1995) and Pope, 
Leitner  and  Leopold-Wildburger  (2006).    Each  stage  is  demarcated  by  one 
particular issue about which there was previously risk and uncertainty becoming 
known, ie on that particular issue, there has been change in knowledge ahead.   
To illustrate the four main stages, consider the central bank of France 
and its decision procedure, upon learning of the July 1993 attack of the franc.  
Table 1 is fictional, but draws on analyses of this event, Eichengreen, Wyplosz, 
Branson and Dornbusch (1993), Cobham (1994) and Mélitz (1994). 
 
Table 1 
The Banque's Four Main Stages of Knowledge Ahead After Encountering a Crisis 
 
Stage / Period 
Outcome Segment 
Activity  Unknown 
1 Pre-Choice set  Discovering Alternatives  Choice set 
2 Pre Choice  Evaluating Alternatives 
a)  safe option – raise interest rates at once; or  
b)  safe option – depreciate at once and exit the EMS; 
or  
c)  risky option – try to ride out the crisis with three 
possible outcomes:  
1,  failure  –  big  depreciation  after  losing  huge 
amount of taxpayers' funds in a vain effort to 
hold  the  Franc  within  the  EMS  band  and 
failing  to  persuade  the  EMS  committee  to 
widen the band;  
2, modest luck – a bit of a drop below the old 
band in the franc's value, and having to keep 
interest rates higher than desirable to fend off 
future  attacks,  but  able  to  get  the  band 
widened so that still in the EMS; or  
3 huge luck – no  
Lay out for each alternative its major possible effects 
and  evaluate  how  these  impact  on  the  Banque's 




3 Pre-outcome*  Waiting to learn its luck with choice of c) and finding 
the  economy's  efficiency  diminished  through 
speculation / hedging 
Last  Outcome 
Segment 
4 Post-Outcome  Living with modest luck under its choice of c) of not  Nothing – full Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  12  16 April 2008 
too big a loss in taxpayer funds and to private sector 
stakeholders  with  prior  debts  in  DM  that  have 




* Irrelevant, as of zero duration, if the Banque had chosen sure alternative a) or b) 
 
Table 1's stages of knowledge ahead framework allows us to identify, for the 
chooser who has encountered a problem that warrants action, what is uncertain at 
each stage.  
 
7 BUILDING BLOCS 
SKAT highlights uncertainty – avoids us skipping over it as in EUT.  Within its 
umbrella, we can construct models to shed light on the key exchange rate regime 
choice issue.  This key issue is whether the costs of exchange rate uncertainty 
outweigh the possible benefits of using it.  Already useful work has been done 
on measuring the degree of pressure experienced in holding exchange rates, eg 
Horváth  (2005)  and  predecessor  work  in  this  area.  The  next  steps  in  this 
direction are to measure the uncertainty costs of applying such pressure.     
a  Behavioural Studies 
There is scope for descriptive and qualitative analyses of the actual pressures on 
official and private sector key participants in the exchange rate process.   As 
Simon (1955, 1996) warns, arm-chair theorising is no substitute for looking and 
describing  how  choices  are  derived,  how  the  evaluations  are  conducted.2  
Analyses  of  how central  bankers  evaluated and chose  over  some time  spans 
include, for France those listed above Table 1, for England, Cobham (2002a, 
2002b and 2006) and for the US, Mehrling (2001) and Goodfriend and King 
(2005).   
Changes take place as the disadvantages of one regime choice became 
transparent and a different regime choice seemed more attractive, Eichengreen, 
Wyplosz, Branson and Dornbusch (1993).  The changes highlight the fact that 
official sectors and their economic advisers have no global maximising overview 
of where to move their currency area under a float.  The changes are in general 
character remarkably similar to the foreign exchange rate dealers studied by de 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006).  They found that these dealers switch from one 
technique to another as another starts seeming more attractive.   
There  has  been  failure  to  model  these  changes  in  assessing  whether 
flexible exchange rates are good.  The changes may well explain much of our 
failure  as  economists  to  detect  "fundamentals"  and  out  of  sample  robustly 
predict the exchange rate.  This may well explain much of the exchange rate's 
unpredictability  to  the  private  sector.    Since  official  sectors  are  made  up  of 
human beings, it is implausible that this will change.  In our complex world, 
typically they will keep trying to do a better job, and to do so by switching to 
another  regime  –  the  process  of  institutional  forgetting  –  often  via  a  major 
change of leadership at the top.  Changes in official sector exchange rate regime 
reflect our successive new generation models of the exchange rate process, with 
no solid evidence that we can yet discern where equilibria are, and shift exchange 
rates to attain them.   Our latest generation models require the out-of-sample 
robustness check of the next exchange rate crises.   
                                                 
2  Out  of  his  looking  at  how  decisions  really  are  made  during  a  period  as  a  student  worker  in  a 
government  office,  he  constructed  his  satisficing  model  (1955).    A  variant  on  this  model  is  the 
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b  Safety margins for "Equilibria" 
SKAT allows us to incorporate into our policy advice safety margins in the way 
that our electric jug turns itself off – a fallible person may not remember and 
burn the element – and that a bridge engineer adds a safety margin for materials 
input  –  his  model  of  the  sandiness  of  the  soil  beneath  and  the  give  in  the 
materials used may be faulty.  The bridge engineer's safety margin is based on 
the number of past bridge collapses.  As techniques improve, countries lower 
safety margins, from say seven a century plus back to three or less today in 
many countries.   
It is an interesting question, what sort of safety margin should be put 
around the claim that floating exchange rate regimes are good since they enable 
equilibria to be reached more rapidly.  Our evidence from econometric modelling 
failures  and  from  policy  advice  bias, would  suggest  that  our  models  are  so 
unreliable as to require a safety margin far above seven before concluding that 
deregulation, floating exchange rates  should be introduced, and countries not 
treated as social outcasts likely to beggar their neighbours if floating.   
SKAT allows us to put the safety margin somewhere.  EUT does not.  
EUT requires every outcome to be evaluated as if certain.  There is no way to 
consistently consider any uncertainty effects experienced in chronological time.  
Recall Figure 1.  There is no way to consider the impact of the range of possible 
outcomes, eg by a measure such as their variance.  This is apparent from Figure 
1 and equation (1).  It has also been proven formally, eg Schneeweiß (1968a, 
1968b, 1973a, 1973b), Borch (1969) and Feldstein (1969).  The only way could 
be a coincidence if choice were limited to a set of complete perfect markets, 
something that does not exist.   
c  Missed Costs via the EUT Lens 
Even though the EUT lens forbids looking at variance, economists have looked 
to see if exchange rate volatility has costs.  But the EUT lens has damaged the 
estimation process.  We give one example here related to that theory omitting the 
earlier three  stages  of  the  decision  (and thus  economic  production)  process.  
This concerns how exchange rate uncertainty affects international flows of 1) 
portfolio capital, 2) direct investment and 3) goods.  Here, even for 1), portfolio 
investment, the lags are typically considerable due to inertia at the borrower end.  
Even though the funds were borrowed short term, they are for normal business 
activity typically, so that rollover is needed, and the discrepancies between local 
and foreign interest rates, not to mention issues of local fund availability, can 
continue for extended periods.  For 2) direct investment and 3), international 
goods shipment, there are substantial set-up costs.   
  Thus  for  all  three  groups  of  private  sector  clients  of  exchange  rate 
dealers, the lags between events, decisions and actions need to be considered.  
We need to stop wearing out EUT lens where all this is instantaneous.  We need 
to understand the evaluation stage in Table 1, and how lengthy it is, including 
implementation aspects since nothing is quite certain until that is done.  Consider 
for instance the drop in the EURO soon after its introduction attributed in the 
financial press (possibly with inside knowledge) to the lags in three European 
companies paying for their massive US direct investments by shipping funds 
from  the  EURO  bloc.    As  regards  trade  flows, estimates  from  Pope  (1981, 
1985b and 1987) suggest a response lag of 15 months after an exchange rate 
change.  This is likely because deciding whether to alter inter-country supply 
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firm typically only does once a year, whereas it responds monthly or even more 
rapidly to demand changes that often only involve matters of varying overtime, 
slack or minor increments and decrements in the labour force.   
When we look adequately in stage 2 of Table 1, we shall start getting 
more suitable modelling of the effects of exchange rate variability.  Presently we 
often try to estimate it with quarterly data, or even monthly or weekly (as this 
gives us more degrees of freedom, and consider only lags up to a year.  But if 
the actual lags for most of the effects start little before a year when we look at 
real  world  decision  making,  we  can  see  that  we  have  been  misusing 
econometrics.  We can see for instance that the minimal effects detected on trade 
from exchange rate variability in most studies, stems from us starting and ending 
the lags far too soon. 
Already  useful  work  has  also  been  done  on  the  costs  of  variable 
exchange rates without identifying any extent to which this is caused by the 
uncertainty itself, or by other factors.  Thus Mundell (1961) attributes to variable 
exchange  rates  much  of  the  misery  of  the  Great  Depression.    Rose  (2000) 
identifies trade costs from any unpredictability whatsoever in exchange rates. An 
interesting  step  at  qualitatively  separating  transactions  from  pure  uncertainty 
effects on trade, is Adam and Cobham (2005), a study that also ventures into 
measuring the effects of more versus less unpredictable exchange rates.   
SKAT  allows  us  to  look  in  a  sensible  realistic  way  into  the  micro-
foundations of decisions taken by those influencing exchange rate changes.  For 
descriptive and estimation work, it allows us in a sensible realistic way to lay out 
the anticipated beneficially or (mostly) adversely affected by these unpredictable 
changes, and to estimate uncertainty effects with more realistic lags. It allows us 
to see economists and official sectors as non-maiximising human beings – ones 
not too dissimilar to the exchange rate dealers identified in eg de Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006).   
For prescriptive work, SKAT allows us to consider real time uncertainty 
effects and put safety margins around the "equilibria" we see variable exchange 
rates effecting via the Swan-Mundell model, and thus more realistically analyse 
the wisdom of retaining flexible exchange rates.  SKAT can allow every policy 
proposal to be accompanied by a measure of its safety margin.  A new branch of 
statistics  can  emerge  on  methods  of  measuring  the  safety  margins  for  the 
purported  effects  of  current  policies  and  proposed  new  ones,  both  in  the 
exchange rate area and in other areas. 
 
 
8 EXPERIMENTAL APPLICATION OF SKAT TO EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
An experimental  set-up is  sketched  below in which  participants  perform the 
roles  of  central  bankers,  government  officials,  union  and  employer  wage 
bargainers and of firms, each with specified objectives pertinent to their roles.  
The set-up was conducted with a single currency and with two currencies, one 
for each of two countries.  The set-up allows for some of a key stage of SKAT 
omitted under maximising models, namely that of evaluating outcomes.  Each 
participant  had to evaluate how to  seek to attain  his  set  of  goals within  his 
constraints.  In the case of the official sector, these constraints are the standard 
ones of reality, namely too few instruments, and the goals were also standard 
ones, namely keeping price steady, predicting them well, keeping the interest rate 
at its ideal, attaining its exchange rate goal, keeping international competitiveness 
steady, and employment neither too high nor too low, with the latter being more 
serious.  For the Mundell (1961) case of flexible exchange rates, the key focus Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  15  16 April 2008 
is the maintenance of international competitiveness in the face of a full variety of 
types of shocks with wages sticky due to union wage negotiations and employer 
wage  negotiation  tactics.    Our  experiments  accordingly  include  union  and 
employer representative wage bargainers and the gamut of types of shocks.  Our 
experiments  revealed  that  this  was  significantly  better  maintained  with  a 
currency union.  For further details, see Pope, Selten, Kube and von Hagen 
(forthcoming). 
  This  finding  from  our  experiment  would  be  impossible  with  a 
maximising model.  In our experiment, participants have to use their own limited 
understanding of the complex economic set-up of the experiment and of how 
others will react to seek to attain their goals.  By contrast maximising models are 
constrained to make the world modelled so simple that the official sector could 
not do worse if given the extra degree of freedom of being able to alter the 
exchange rate.   
That is to say, in conventional non-SKAT economic modelling in which 
stage 2 is skipped over, the maximising official sectors simply calculate that 
fixed exchange rates are best and, given the power of fully cooperating official 
sectors to fully set the exchange rate, would set it.  In the real world however, 
neither  a  central  banker  nor  anyone  else  can  compute  the  "optimising" 
equilibrium, and thus is ignorant of where that equilibrium is, as also of how to 
attain it.  This opens the possibility, found in our experiment, that eliminating 
one  complexity,  exchange  rate  uncertainty,  can  improve  the  situation.    The 
private sector one may remark, knew this a century and more ago.  It chose the 
gold standard, as close as could be gotten to a single currency.  In developed 
countries moreover, prior to the disruption of the First World War, the private 
sector with some government help, succeeded in maintaining this, including in 
countries like Australia in which the totally unregulated private banks printed 
their own notes and chose their own exchange rate – pegged to gold.  See eg 
David Pope (1991). 
In the misleading process of skipping stage 2 and evaluation that no real 
person can do in a maximising fashion, extreme simplifications are required.  
Otherwise the economist constructing the model could not solve it even after 
weeks, months, of energetic analysing that the model supposes every economic 
actor does effortlessly and instantaneously miraculously somehow in the brain 
via  untraceable  means.    The  extreme  simplifications  involved  include  those 
implicit assumptions of Mundell (1961) highlighted in this paper, namely the 
absence of uncertainty of what will happen, of what anyone else will do, and 
typically, an absence of market power, ie the small world assumption of so-
called rational expectations.  Allowing for market power – as advised by Merton 
(2001) after identifying that ignoring market power was key to the breakdown 
of the Long Term Capital Management fund, and also by Soros (1987) who is 
aware  of  his  own  market  power  –  makes  the  maximising  model  virtually 
impossible to solve.  
Partly for this reason, to the author's knowledge, no exchange rate model 
includes indubitable facts about market power like that mentioned in the prior 
paragraph, namely that of fully cooperating official sectors to set their exchange 
rate.    To  her  knowledge  the  first  model  incorporating  such  market  power, 
carefully eschewing the impossibility of ascertaining any maximising procedure 
for  so  doing,  is  that  of  Pope,  Selten  and von  Hagen  of  which  a  particular 
parameterisation is in Pope, Selten, Kaiser, Kube and von Hagen (2007).  The 
difficulty of incorporating official sector market power plus that of key private 
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adequately abandoning the small country assumption – can be gauged from our 
experimental set-up.  It needed to be constructed such that advanced economics 
students could play it after an hour plus of instruction, and sufficiently well not 
to have made such losses that they abandoned play before the end of the day.  
Reality as we know is more complex: giant multi-national firms go broke if not 
bailed out by their governments, and official sectors run up losses of billions 
through their misunderstandings of the system.  Nevertheless the set-up was 
sufficiently complex that Reinhard Selten was unable to ascertain if it had a 
game  theoretic  equilibrium.    He  needed  to  construct  a  new  concept  of  an 
incomplete equilibrium whereby branches that could not improve payoff are not 
investigated, and for this obtained under plausible selection criteria, a unique 
symmetric equilibrium that could be a reasonably traditional benchmark against 
which to judge the performance of our experimental participants.   
The lack of a unique equilibrium even under the concept of incomplete 
equilibrium conforms to other disquieting information on equilibria, even within 
conventional  simple maximising models.   This is the  finding  of  Grandmont 
(1985) that for a range of standard models within the plausible parameter range, 
few would be both stable and unique as required for flexible exchange rates to 
be  justifiable  as  an  equilibrating  mechanism.    Subsequent  investigations 
reinforce these concerns that the equilibrium concept is of doubtful value, de 
Arcangelis and Gandolfo (1996), Chichilnisky (1999), Hahn (1999), Drèze and 
Herings  (2003),  Phelps  (1999),  Barnett  and  He  (1999),  Sordi  and  Vercelli 
(2003) and Dieci, Sordi and Vercelli (2006). 
Consider  what  our  inability  to  discern  an  indubitably  unique  stable 
equilibrium, even in the simplified setting of our laboratory set-up, means.  It 
means  that  none  of  the  simpler  again  exchange  rate  models  used  to  justify 
flexible exchange rates, neither Mundell (1961) nor later elaborations, identify 
true equilibria.  None take into account the actual and uncontroversial market 
powers  of  leading  exchange  rate  participants.    Most  of  these  models,  by 
skipping stage 2, assert that there is an identifiable equilibrium after a shock, and 
that according to the simplified model, changing the exchange rate can put the 
economy on the new equilibrium.  The algebraic modelling, with no stage 2 
evaluation  to  discover  that  the  equilibrium  is  indiscernible,  blithely  leads 
economists into declaring where is the new equilibrium – in the form of the 
appalling panoply of beggar-they-neighbour advice documented above.  Further, 
when economists have such simple models, Davidson (2007) seems to be alone 
in looking at the aggregate international implications of their equilibrating advice 
–  in  noticing  what  this  paper  identifies  as  the  violation  of  international 
accounting identities in which a plus shock to employment in one currency area 
must be matched by a minus shock to employment in another currency area.   
 
9  THE CHALLENGES OF MODELLING WITHIN SKAT 
SKAT is attractive.  SKAT allows understanding that economists find 
some parts of the evaluation process so difficult that they fail to notice that their 
perceptions of equilibrium are not in the right ballpark.  SKAT allows a start of 
the  re-think  on whether  it is  nonsense to talk about  flexible exchange  rates 
equilibrating when our perceptions of equilibria are not merely hazy, but biased 
in a manner dangerous to international cooperation and peace.  SKAT allows us 
to include the effects of all key stages from encountering a problem to after all 
uncertainty is resolved – including the effects of the principal heuristics that 
central bankers, speculators and others use in the evaluation stage. Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  17  16 April 2008 
Qualitative,  quantitative  and  algebraic  modelling  within  the  SKAT 
umbrella will be demanding.  But so also has been demanding modelling within 
the false maximising tradition of the current paradigm.  SKAT modelling need 
not be more demanding than at present.  What is altered is which challenges are 
addressed.  Under the current modelling paradigm, the challenges addressed are 
more akin to constructing mathematical crossword puzzles.  This is because the 
challenges under our current paradigm are devising new models still tractable 
enough  for  deductions  –  after  months  of  energetic  mathematical  work,  the 
challenge is met, and a theorem or lemma deduced.  This tractability constraint 
on  keeping  the  challenges  meetable  precludes  modelling  under  the  current 
paradigm having assumptions that conform to stylised facts.  Assumptions that 
conform  to  the  stylised  facts  make  the  challenge  bar  too  high  given  the 
tractability  constraint.    The  tractability  constraint  is  to  obtain  an  informative 
linear  deduction  when  the  entire  model  is  artificially  constrained  to  imply 
inherently  a  uni-dimensional  index  to  be  maximised within  an  epistemically 
atemporal framework. 
By contrast, under SKAT, the challenges addressed involve less focus 
on mathematical derivations from maximising a uni-dimensional index subject 
to various conditions.  Under SKAT, economics can be more like other sciences 
concerned with understanding and improving the real world.  SKAT can allow 
economists to look more seriously at the cause effect chains of the real world, 
and at the stages from facing a problem and thus uncertainty, through to its 
resolution.  Thereby economics can return to be a  science, where  science is 
defined more broadly than abstract mathematics.  The change in focus on which 
are the important challenges to meet that arise from switching to SKAT, and 
thus to what challenges an economist should aspire can enable economics to 
become less dangerous in offering exchange rate advice than at present.  At 
present economic advice to change exchange rates is especially dangerous, as 
neither the economists proffering advice to change exchange rates, nor those 
receiving the advice, bear in mind that the advice stems from models that are 
contrary to  stylised  facts.    Consider also the  scope  delineated in  Part  8 for 
experiments  within  the  SKAT  umbrella  to  side-step  some  of  the  need  for 
meeting the challenge of doing any sort of algebraic modelling.  Consider too 
the  scope  for  experiments  to  shed  light  on  what  is  appropriate  algebraic 
modelling of each of SKAT's stages.  
 
10  SUMMARY 
Mundell (1961) remains the lynchpin of those calling for official sectors to 
retain separate currencies so as to restore equilibria after shocks.  But this paper 
has identified:  1)  overlooked certainty  features and largely  overlooked  small 
country features of Mundell (1961) that destroy its equilibrating capacity; and 
2)  biassed  application  of  Mundell  (1961)  amongst  economists  calling  for 
exchange rate changes – all calls are of the beggar-thy-neighbour form.  Such 
bias is a danger to international cooperation and peace. 
The  bias  that  stems  from modelling within the  umbrella  of expected 
utility  theory.    This  umbrella  skips  the  evaluation  stage  and  pretends  that 
economists (and everyone else) can maximise and infallibly discern international 
disequilibria.  This paper has shown how a more realistic umbrella, SKAT, the 
Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, can introduce the evaluation stage and later 
stages,  and  enable  more  realistic  and  safer  appraisals  of  whether  flexible 
exchange rates are desirable.   Pope Beggar Thy Neighbour via Mundell  18  16 April 2008 
Within the  umbrella  of  SKAT, this  paper  has  reported  results  of  an 
experiment indicating that a currency union, indeed a single world money, better 
enables  external  equilibrium  in  the  sense  of  better  maintaining  international 
competitiveness.    The  experimental  results  indicate  that  the  additional 
complexity of exchange rate uncertainty from variable exchange rates on average 
damages macroeconomic policy.  That is, the experimental results indicate that 
multiple currencies are not merely dangerous in their demonstrated tendency to 
entice  economists  to  biasedly  advocate  uncooperative  beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies.  The experimental results indicate that multiple currencies are actually 
inefficient.  They are inefficient in the sense that they damage maintenance of 
international competitiveness in the face of wage stickiness due to union and 
employer representative bargains and the range of sorts of shocks to aggregate 
supply, aggregate demand and of expenditures switching sorts.   
The  paper's  findings  thus  provide  fresh  evidence  in  favour  of  fixed 
exchange rates on two new grounds from those already adduced, eg in Mundell 
(1961  concerning  transaction  costs,  and  in  McKinnon  (1963)  concerning 
exchange rate uncertainty effects on liquidity.  First, is safer for international 
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